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Abstract 
 
Many developed countries have boosted investment into High-Speed Rail (HSR). 
This infrastructure is costly and requires high investment during the construction 
and operation periods, which is mainly financed with public funds. This economic 
effort is seldom set off, which leads to subsidies with the money collected from 
public debt growth or tax pressure increases. The question that immediately 
emerges is whether the entrance of this new infrastructure generates spillovers at 
the local level. In this paper, we answer this question by using local data on 
economic activity, municipalities’ characteristics and local public budgets in Spain 
for the past decade (2001–2010). To approach to this problem, we use GIS tools 
and build a database to estimate the impact by considering difference-in-difference 
analysis. Our estimations yield a general conclusion: when HSR comes to town, 
both local revenues and the local fiscal gap improve by 10% and 16%, respectively. 
These improvements primarily affect municipalities located within 5 km of an HSR 
station. 
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1. Introduction 
High-speed rail (HSR) has become an alternative to mass transport around the 
world and countries such as China, Spain, Japan and France have boosted its 
development.4 This type of infrastructure requires high investment costs and high 
maintenance and operation costs, which are mostly financed with public funds. 
This investment should be compensated by the positive economic effects (e.g. time 
savings, reduction of externalities, wider economic effects) that the provision of 
the infrastructure may generate. 
However, this is not always the case. De Rus (2012) shows for the case of Spain 
and Albalate and Bel (2012) review the main international experiences to highlight 
the huge costs associated with the infrastructure. Under this scenario, the public 
funds required for the construction of HSR lines are not going to be recovered, 
which may lead to public debt growth or tax pressure increases. 
Specifically, in Spain, HSR lines are mostly financed by the central government, and 
cofinanced with European funds, while most of the economic effects occur at the 
                                                 
1 Authors thank comments and suggestions by Daniel Albalate, Javier Campos, Beatriz González López-Valcárcel, 
Jordi Perdiguero, Augusto Voltes-Dorta and an anonymous referee from working paper collection “Cátedra Pasqual 
Maragall”. All errors are ours. Aday Hernández thanks grant by Cátedra Pasqual Maragall (2011). 
2 Departamento de Análisis Económico Aplicado. Facultad de Economía, Empresa y Turismo. Universidad de Las 
Palmas de Gran Canaria. Despacho D. 2-14. Campus de Tafira. 35017. Las Palmas. 
ahernandez@acciones.ulpgc.es; tel: +34 928 458 208. 
3 Contact author: Departamento de Análisis Económico Aplicado. Facultad de Economía, Empresa y Turismo. 
Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. Despacho D. 2-12. Campus de Tafira. 35017. Las Palmas. 
juanluis.jimenez@ulpgc.es; tel: +34 928 458 191. 
4 There are planned or existing HSR lines in Africa, Asia, North America, South America and Europe through 
ambitious network expansion (Campos and de Rus, 2009). 
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regional or municipality level. Therefore, a controversial relation may arise in the 
long run between these two government levels. The local government claims to 
have an infrastructure that it does not finance entirely, wondering about the future 
positive effects that may not always happen. 
Consequently, local governments and mayors attempt to get an HSR station, as if 
this would spontaneously generate economic benefits for their voters. In 
particular, during the recent financial crisis, mayors considered that investment in 
HSR infrastructure may partly solve local problems by improving local economic 
activity.5 However, local governments have to recognise the extra expenses and 
increases in public services, which may or may not be compensated by the 
potential economic activity generated by the infrastructure. 
The main goal of our paper is to shed light on how the construction of new HSR 
lines affects local finance considering the main variables of local budgets. Despite 
the extensive literature regarding the relationship between infrastructure and the 
impact of public expense (Solé-Ollé, 2006a), previous authors, to our knowledge, 
have not explored the impact of the infrastructure on local budgets at the 
municipality level. 
In order to analyse this relationship, we build a local database for the past decade 
(2001–2010) that includes variables that capture not only local economic activity 
and public budgets, but also the Geographic Information System (GIS) information 
used to detail potential spillover effects. Our estimations support the fact that HSR 
improves both local revenues and local budgets after HSR entrance. 
Section 2 presents the literature review on HSR effects and local budget analysis. 
Section 3 provides some facts about HSR projects in Spain, while the database and 
considered covariates are explained in Section 4. Section 5 develops the empirical 
strategy and estimations and, lastly, Section 6 summarises the main contributions 
and results. 
                                                 
5 One recent example is the mayor of Vigo, Abel Caballero, and his defence of the HSR investment for his region. A 
long version of the interview can be found here: 
http://www.atlantico.net/noticia/255439/caballero/vigo/recuperacion/economica/  
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2. Literature review  
As mentioned above, public investment, particularly transport infrastructure 
investment, is a powerful mechanism for enhancing economic growth and 
employment in the short run. Aschauer (1989) was the first to assess the role of 
public investment in economic growth and productivity improvements. Since then, 
works have focused on exploring the links between infrastructure investment and 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP (Munnell, 1990; Holtz-Eakin, 1994; 
Gramlich, 1994 for a review literature), productivity growth (SACTRA, 1999; 
Haughwout, 2002) and employment (Vickerman, 2002, Dalemberg et al., 1998). 
However, the macroeconomic impacts are useless for making an individual 
decision about a project because this is context-specific—both in type (line or 
point infrastructure, etc.) and in its position within the network. Consequently, the 
spatial dimension needs to be discussed because investment in one region depends 
on the local conditions, existent transport modes and infrastructure provision in 
other regions, among others (Vickerman, 1991). 
In this setting, we focus on the effect of public infrastructure investment, in 
particular HSR, assuming that positive effects are translated into effects on the 
budgets of the administrative entities around the infrastructure. The role of the 
spatial dimension is widely justified because the infrastructure interacts with the 
space and the location of the economic activity.6 Usually, these effects arise from 
individual decisions and take place at a disaggregate dimension of the economic 
activity (Graham, 2006), and that is why we should focus on the municipality level, 
thereby allowing us to identify variation at a small spatial scale. In this sense, two 
properties of the analysis are desirable: (i) avoiding predefined units such as 
administrative areas (Spanish municipalities in our case) and (ii) emphasising 
distance or density in order to include a transport dimension that determines the 
                                                 
6 The mechanisms that produce changes in the spatial dimension of the economic activity such as agglomeration 
economics arise from technological spillovers, consumer concentration or improvements in the labour market (see 
Rosenthal and Strange, 1995 for a further explanation). 
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spatial behaviour of the impacts. These two conditions are further analysed in 
Section 3. 
From the previous discussion, it is clear that public transport investment affects 
the revenues of administrative entities if the potential positive benefits of the 
investment capitalises in the region generating additional economic activity. 
However, the final effect is likely to depend on how the increased spending is 
financed. Empirical studies, at the aggregate level, such as those of Engen and 
Skinner (1996) find evidence that increases in tax rates reduce the rate of 
economic growth. An increase in public capital, which, in most cases, requires an 
increase in tax rates, will stimulate economic growth only if the productivity 
impact of the public capital exceeds the adverse tax impact. 
Consequently, the financing mechanism and tax structure need to be considered. 
Transport policy in Spain is in the hands of national and regional governments, and 
the fiscal policy provides too few incentives for an efficient use of funds. There is 
no direct correspondence between expenses and collected taxes, encouraging 
regions to exaggerate their needs for funds. Therefore, there is no direct relation 
between the entity that finances the infrastructure (national/supranational) and 
the entity that gets benefits (regional/local) from economic activity increases. 
Further, HSR is associated with a "tunnel effect" (Gutiérrez Puebla, 2004). HSR 
develops the final nodes, lacking the generation of economic activity throughout 
the territory where it develops. Hence, a polarisation effect leads to increased 
accessibility at the nodes of the infrastructure, isolating intermediate regions from 
the poles (which attract business). This allows us to focus only on the effects that 
take place surrounding the station (at different distances). 
The analysis of distances is an important consideration to appraise the 
construction of a new infrastructure. A relevant question is whether the 
infrastructure performs better in the region where it is built or plays in favour of 
adjacent regions. On one hand, the infrastructure may encourage new activities 
and the location of new enterprises, while, on the other hand, dispersion forces 
may lead to a delocalisation of firms, reducing the expected benefits of the 
infrastructure (Krugman and Venables, 1995; Puga, 2002). The final result 
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depends on the local conditions, existent transport modes and infrastructure 
provision in other regions. 
Regarding to regional and sectorial impacts, we must consider, as Esteban Martín 
(1998) claims, that cities served by HSR usually have alternative transport mode, 
such as conventional train or. These are clearly affected by the new alternative and 
operator companies do reduce the number of services. Moreover, there may be 
some second-order effects on directly linked sectors such as tourism or hospitality. 
Business tourism and conferences benefit from new HSR services, but it may 
produce a reduction in the number of overnight stays, cutting tourist expenditure 
and the consumption of hotel services.  
Albalate and Bel (2012) review the experiences of HSR around the world and 
literature related to regional effects, reporting that regions whose economic 
conditions compare unfavourably with those of their neighbours, a new HSR 
infrastructure may even result an overall negative impact (Givoni 2006; Van den 
Berg and Pol 1998; Thompson 1995).  
For this reason, we consider in our analysis variables that capture the local 
environment. Thus, we focus on the academic literature on local fiscal budgets and 
the related literature on Spanish municipalities. Zafra-Gómez et al. (2009) focus on 
identifying the key determinants of local financial performance: income, 
unemployment and population, among others. Other references are linked to the 
identification of the determinants of local deficits or tax burdens, as in Lago-Peñas 
(2004) for the region of Galicia and Sollé-Ollé (2006a), Fluvià et al. (2008), Bastida 
et al. (2009) and Benito et al. (2010) for Spanish-wide samples. 
All these studies consider population to be the main variable. This covariate allows 
us to test for scale economies in the provision of public services at a local level (see 
Allers et al., 2001; Petterson-Lidbom, 2001; Castells et al., 2004; Fluvià et al., 2008, 
among others). Other important variables are the proportion of elderly (>65) and 
young (<20) residents and the immigration rate (e.g. Zafra-Gómez et al., 2009; 
Voltes-Dorta et al., forthcoming). These age groups are key drivers of demand for 
municipal services, such as employment, health and education, while a significant 
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proportion of senior citizens may lead to a decrease in demand for other services 
such as sports facilities (Zárate and Vallés, 2012). 
Lastly, income per capita and the unemployment rate are economic indicators that 
also affect local budgets (Bastida et al., 2009; Benito et al., 2010). The effect of 
tourism on local budgets must also be taken into account because of the several 
positive and negative effects that it may induce (see Voltes-Dorta et al., 
forthcoming). This paper is based on previous contributions, but it differentiates 
from those in several ways: firstly, it uses GIS analysis to capture the spatial 
component, which is crucial for assigning economic impacts, and secondly, it 
considers a difference-in-difference (DiD) methodology. 
 
3. HSR in Spain (AVE): some facts 
Transport infrastructures play a key role in European Union policy, and total 
investment during the 2000–2006 period was 859€ billion. The cost of 
establishing an efficient trans-European transport network (TEN-T) has been 
estimated to be over 1.5€ trillion for the 2010–2030 period. 
Spain has also followed the European strategy and has bet intensively on transport 
infrastructure. The Spanish government has promoted heavily the development of 
an HSR network as shown in the Strategic Infrastructure and Transport Plan, 
which includes the main activities in infrastructure and transport between 2005 
and 2020, with a total investment of 241,392€ million. It values significantly the 
possibilities that infrastructures have for regional cohesion and employment, as 
proven by its commitment to create an HSR network that aims to have 90% of the 
mainland Spanish population located within 50 km of a station. At the end of the 
period, the whole network will have 10,000 km of HSR. 
The 3,000 km of HSR in service (at December 2013) is the longest high-speed 
network in Europe and second worldwide and it is composed of four main 
corridors. Table 1 shows the lines in service with all the cities through which the 
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network develops and the first year of operation and Figure 1 describes the 
geographical distribution of the HSR network. 
 
Table 1. HSR network (AVE) in Spain in 2013 
Lines in services Cities 
First year of 
operation 
Madrid – Seville 
Madrid – Ciudad Real – Puertollano – 
Córdoba – Seville 
1992 
Madrid – Zaragoza – 
Barcelona 
Madrid – Guadalajara – Catalayud – 
Zaragoza – Lleida 
2003 
Lleida – Campo de Tarragona 2006 
Campo de Tarragona – Barcelona-
Sants 
2008 
Madrid – Toledo Madrid – Toledo 2005 
Zaragoza – Huesca Zaragoza – Tardienta – Huesca 2005 
Madrid – Segovia – Valladolid Madrid – Segovia – Valladolid 2007 
Córdoba – Málaga 
Madrid - Córdoba – Puente Genil – 
Antequera – Málaga 
2007 
Perpiñan – Figueres Figueres – France 2009 
Madrid – Valencia 
Madrid – Cuenca – Requena-Utiel – 
Valencia 
2010 
Madrid – Alicante 
Cuenca – Albacete 2010 
Albacete – Alicante 2013 
Olmedo – Zamora - Galicia 
Orense – Santiago de Compostela – A 
Coruña 
2011 
Barcelona – French Border 
Barcelona-Sants – Barcelona-Sagrera 
– Girona – Figueres 
2013 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Figure 1. HSR network (AVE) in Spain in 2013 
 
 Source: ADIF. 
 
 
The establishment of the HSR has reorganised the transport markets in Spain. In 
fact, Jiménez and Betancor (2012) study the strategic reactions of airlines in the 
Spanish transport market after the entrance of HSR. By using panel data from 1999 
to 2009 and applying an instrumental variable analysis, Jiménez and Betancor 
(2012) conclude that “(…) the entry of HSR in Spain has reduced on average the 
number of air transport operations by 17 percent, though this result differs, 
depending on the route and the airlines considered”. 
Moreover, two more facts have occurred. First, the entrance of HSR has allowed 
demand to increase by between 8% and 35%, depending on the routes, without 
differentiating between deviated and generated demand (see Annex 1 for a further 
analysis of the routes). Consequently, the entrance of HSR has changed the market 
share of air transport. 
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4. Database 
To compute the impact of HSR entrance on our variables of interest, we use a panel 
dataset composed of 3,400 Spanish municipalities with more than 1,000 
inhabitants in the period 2001–2010. Our main source is the La Caixa’s Economic 
Yearbook, which includes a set of the variables of interest regarding population, 
extension and the importance of tourism, among others. A second source is 
provided by the Ministry of Public Administration, which collects variables 
regarding the financial situations of municipalities (revenues, expenses, public 
debt or deficit, among others).7 
The HSR network develops along the territory and has economic effects on the 
surrounding populations. The spatial dimension of its effects requires the use of 
GIS8 to reference the database geographically and to capture the role of the 
distance. The procedure is as follows: 
1. Localise HSR stations geographically. Spain has four main corridors but we 
only include HSR lines that started before 2009 (see Table 1). Ideally, we 
would appraise the existent HSR network but the lack of a reliable database 
prevents this. 
2. To capture the spatial dimension, we establish concentric circles around 
HSR stations. When these circles cover only part of the surface of the 
municipality, we only consider the proportion of the municipality affected 
by the infrastructure. The aim is to establish influence areas to examine the 
impact of the relevant variables on local budgets. We repeat this procedure 
for concentric circles of 5, 10 and 20 km.9 
The point of building concentric circles of different kilometres around the HSR 
station is twofold; to limit the influence area of the infrastructure and to explore 
how the impact of the infrastructure evolves over distance. To capture the impact, 
we need to georeference the previous database with a set of variables of interest, 
such as: 
                                                 
7 Data were collected from http://serviciosweb.meh.es/apps/entidadeslocales/. 
8 GIS is a system of hardware and software used for the storage, retrieval, mapping and analysis of geographic data. 
A GIS can be thought of as a system—it digitally creates and “manipulates” spatial areas. 
9 See Hernández (2012) for a more detailed description of this procedure. 
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i) Financial autonomy per capitait: the proportion of local revenues included in 
chapters I, II and III relative to total local revenues regarding population per 
municipality i in year t. This proxies for the municipality’s ability to 
generate revenue as opposed to being dependent on central or regional 
government transfers. Source: own elaboration from the database of the 
Ministry of Public Administration. 
ii) Public debt per capitait: public debt per capita for municipality i in year t. 
Source: Ministry of Public Administration. 
iii) Fiscal gap per capitait: difference between expenditure per capita (net of 
public debt) and revenue per capita (net of current and capital transfers). 
This alternative measure of deficit focuses on expenditure linked to the 
provision of public services and revenue raised within the municipality 
(Grembi et al., 2012; Voltes-Dorta et al., forthcoming). This covariate is 
better than local fiscal deficit because it does not consider the potential 
effect of financial transfers from regional or central government due to HSR 
entrance. Therefore, it is a better proxy to the local economic approach. 
iv) Yearly property taxit: tax assessed on real estate by the local government. 
The tax is usually based on the value of the property (including the land) 
owned. Source: Ministry of Public Administration. 
v) Touristic indexi: this variable captures whether municipality i is a touristic 
one. As carried out by Voltes-Dorta et al. (forthcoming), this covariate was 
constructed as a revenue-based location quotient of municipal tourism 
intensity. Based on data from La Caixa’s Economic Yearbook, it is the ratio 
between the municipality’s percentage contribution to the tourism 
subsection of the national trade tax revenues and the national percentage 
contribution to the tourism subsection of the national trade tax revenues. 
Source: own elaboration from La Caixa. 
vi) Stratified populationit: this covariate determines the stratus of the 
population which corresponds to municipality i in year t. According to the 
Regulatory Law of Local Municipalities (Ley Reguladora de las Bases de 
Régimen Local), municipalities must offer a range of compulsory services 
according to population criteria. This law clearly conditions the local 
expenses, and thus we decided to include the stratified population as an 
exogenous variable.10 Source: own elaboration from La Caixa’s Economic 
Yearbook. 
vii) Dependent populationit: the percentage of the population aged below 16 and 
above 65 in municipality i in year t. This type of variable is widely used in 
local analysis as explained in section 2 (see Solé-Ollé, 2006a; Gonçalvez and 
Veiga, 2007; Benito et al.; 2009). Source: National Institute of Statistics and 
own elaboration. 
                                                 
10 In particular, the strata are between 0 and 5,000 inhabitants; 5,000 to 20,000; 20,000 to 50,000; larger than 
50,000; capitals of provinces (NUTS 3 regions); and municipalities larger than 250,000 inhabitants. 
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viii) Areai: measures the surface area of municipality i in square kilometres. This 
figure is obtained from the National Institute of Statistics. 
ix) Population densityit: the ratio between the population and the extension of 
municipality i in year t. Source: National Institute of Statistics and own 
elaboration. 
x) Unemploymentit: the unemployment rate in municipality i in year t that is 
published in the Economic Yearbook of La Caixa. 
xi) We consider another variable called Crisist that is a binary variable that 
takes 1 from 2008 to 2010, and 0 otherwise. This explanatory variable 
controls for the potential effect of the economic crisis and its adverse effect 
on local finances. 
xii) Finally, we include a Trend variable that ranges from 1 to 10 to control for 
the potential time effects for all municipalities. 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables considered. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics. All database. 2001-2010 
Variable Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Revenues per capita 433.74 406.08 0 21,756.04 
Fiscal gap per capita 349.46 409.89 -23,783.16 5,397.35 
Yearly property tax 0.565 0.150 0 1.3 
Debt per capita 43.36 92.57 -1.53 5,054.02 
Touristic index 0.74 2.33 0 29.09 
Population (stratified) 1.53 0.81 1 5 
Dependent population 0.35 0.05 0.18 0.62 
Unemployment 7.7 4.29 0 30.5 
Density of population 369.12 1,261.34 1.56 22,401 
Crisis 0.30 - 0 1 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Revenues per capita show average revenue of 433.74 euros, while the fiscal gap 
and debt per capita are 349.46 and 43.36, respectively. The latter show one of the 
main problems in Spain: the persistent debt of local governments. On average, the 
density population is equal to 369.12 people and unemployment with respect to 
the total population is 7.7. With regard to the touristic index, the average value is 
0.74, which varies between 0 for non-touristic municipalities and 29.09 for the 
most touristic one. 
However, our question of interest is whether the entrance of HSR in Spain modifies 
the local budgets of municipalities when it arrives. Our interest is in comparing 
changes in the main variables after the entrance of HSR in these municipalities. For 
this reason, Table 3 includes average data for budget covariates and the yearly 
property tax in order to analyse in a descriptive way whether this exogenous 
change (the entrance of HSR) has modified them. 
To do this, we consider two questions: firstly, we compare municipalities within an 
influence area of HSR of 5 km with those that are out of this influence area; 
secondly, we compare the situation before and after the entrance of HSR. 
Moreover, a t-test for the before and after data was carried out. 
Table 3. Average data by year of entrance. Before and after analysis 
Variable 
Cities with HSR [0-5 kms) Cities without HSR 
Before After Before After 
If HSR entrance was in 2003 
Revenues per capita 366.54 544.90* 336.41 439.57* 
Fiscal gap 175.70 240.86* 266.84 384.71* 
Yearly property tax 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.61* 
Debt per capita 43.06 47.47 38.01 43.81* 
If HSR entrance was in 2005 
Revenues per capita 344.58 491.47* 342.23 457.79* 
Fiscal gap 213.97 290.28* 280.84 426.74* 
Yearly property tax 0.64 0.64 0.59 0.62* 
Debt per capita 44.36 49.94 37.62 45.67* 
14 
 
If HSR entrance was in 2006 
Revenues per capita 401.22 552.01* 359.88 472.78* 
Fiscal gap 194.97 314.15* 281.10 460.90* 
Yearly property tax 0.66 0.66 0.60 0.62* 
Debt per capita 42.49 56.18* 38.17 47.95* 
If HSR entrance was in 2007 
Revenues per capita 452.39 474.38 374.55 468.07* 
Fiscal gap 166.03 364.07* 289.78 506.55* 
Yearly property tax 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.62* 
Debt per capita 38.42 46.51* 38.68 48.87* 
If HSR entrance was in 2008 
Revenues per capita 399.43 516.16* 390.77 474.57* 
Fiscal gap 208.54 368.70* 312.18 529.35* 
Yearly property tax 0.65 0.64 0.61 0.62* 
Debt per capita 51.01 65.51* 39.59 54.06* 
Source: Own elaboration. (*) Asterisk indicates a statistically significant (5%) difference 
between the before and after data by the group of cities (treatment and control group). 
 
Generally, we observe that the mean tests are statistically significant for all 
variables considering cities without HSR and for revenues per capita and fiscal gap 
for cities with HSR. Independent of the year of entrance, the average of our 
relevant variables is higher for cities with HSR than without HSR and for the 
scenario after entrance compared with before. 
By focusing on cities with HSR, we find that the yearly property tax does not vary, 
which implies a pressure on real estate to keep constant before and after the 
entrance of HSR. This is not the case for cities without HSR, where the yearly 
property tax has been used as a tool to modify municipal budgets. Lastly, we 
observe that the mean test of debt per capita is statistically significant when we 
consider a year of entrance after 2006. This finding implies that there is a tendency 
of municipalities to borrow external financial funds. 
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5. Estimations 
Despite previous descriptive results, a causal relationship must be found in order 
to draw structural conclusions. As detailed in previous sections, our main aim is to 
evaluate whether HSR entrance improves local budgets in the municipalities 
where it is located. For this reason, we firstly estimate whether this exogenous 
factor increases local revenues (as a proxy of higher economic activity). The 
increase in economic activity directly translates into higher fiscal revenues 
through the collection of taxes such as business tax, property tax, waste taxes, 
taxes on vehicles and taxes on construction, among others. 
Moreover, if local revenues increase owing to more economic activity (we also 
analyse evolution of local tax increase in Annex II), this may also generate higher 
expenses because new services may be provided. To test this fact, we estimate the 
impact of HSR entrance on the fiscal gap and debt per capita. When these new 
services are funded by own local revenues, the fiscal gap may be worse off; 
otherwise, it may increase debt per capita. 
For this reason, we consider a Difference-in-difference (DiD hereafter) approach to 
estimate the impact of our variable of interest (the entrance of HSR) on the 
endogenous variables. DiD is an econometrics technique that captures the effect of 
a treatment in a given period. The DiD estimation represents the difference 
between the pre-post, within-subject differences of the treatment and control 
groups. Our treatment group is the set of municipalities affected by the 
introduction of the new transport infrastructure and the control group is the 
municipalities that are not affected.11 
As the benchmark, we estimate equation [1]. 
                                                 
11 The Difference-in-difference estimator is the difference in the average outcome in the treatment group before and 
after the change, unless the difference in the average score in the control group before and after the change. So, to 
control this precise effect we have to include three binary variables in our estimations: one which control for potential 
differences in treatment group (CitywithHSR in our analysis); one more that control for potential changes before and 
after the event (PeriodafterHSR in equation 1); and finally, the interaction of those previous variables, i.e., the DiD 
estimator. 
16 
 
 
Y
it
= β
0
+ β
1
CitywithHSR + β
2
PeriodafterHSR + β
3
DiD +
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4
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i
+ β
5
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it
+
+β
6
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it
+ β
7
Unemployment
it
+ β
8
PopDensity
it
+
+β
9
Area
i
+ β
10
Crisis
t
+ β
11
Trend + ε
it
  [1] 
In particular, our dependent variables (Yit) are those related to local municipalities 
that we consider to be relevant and affected by the new infrastructure such as local 
revenues per capita, the yearly property tax (IBI in Spanish), fiscal gap per capita 
and debt per capita. We estimate these individually and separately according to 
[1], but we have to interpret them somehow jointly because a joint interpretation 
allows us to understand the final effect of the infrastructure on local budgets. 
However, one of the most basic assumptions of differences-in-differences models 
is that the temporal effect in the two groups of municipalities is the same in the 
absence of entrance of HSR. So, we first have to test whether both treatment and 
control group show same trend before the opening of the new station. This has 
been called the ‘identifying assumption’. In order to check it, we estimate a similar 
equation than [1] for each endogenous variable and for each route but we 
substitute DiD estimator by separate dummies for treatment and control 
municipalities, in order to check whether the time trends in the pretreatment 
period were the same.12 
The econometric result indicates that we cannot reject even at least at 10 percent 
that affected and control groups (cities with and without HSR) behave equally 
before the introduction of the HSR. This fact does not occur in all routes-years (see 
Tables 4 to 7 and following explanations). 
Table 4 only shows the DiD estimation of revenues per capita on the entrance of 
HSR considering that these vary depending on the municipality and distance to the 
infrastructure.13 In this table, each cell provides the DiD estimator under different 
                                                 
12 The empirical strategy is the following one: firstly we create time-dummies for both control and treatment group. 
Then, we estimate each equation replacing D-i-D variables for these previous variables generated. Finally, we test 
whether coefficientes for each group of time-dummies are equal or not (see Albalate, 2008, for further explanation of 
this empirical strategy). 
13 All estimations in Tables 4 to 7 consider all the covariates explained in equation [1]. They were estimated by 
solving potential heteroskedastic problems. R2 for all estimations ranges from 0.13 to 0.27. Results for covariates 
were those expected at academic literature, i.e., higher tourism activity, higher revenues (Voltes-Dorta et al, 2013); 
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conditions; thus, the row represents the year of entrance of the transport 
infrastructure and the column represents the spatial dimension depending on 
whether the municipality has an HSR station or is within a certain distance (we 
consider 0-5 km, 5–10 km and 10–20 km). 
Table 4. DiD estimation of revenues per capita on the entrance of HSR 
Entrance of 
HSR in… 
Observations HSR station 
HSR station + 
buffer 5 kms 
[5-10 
kilometers] 
[10-20 
kilometers] 
2003 28,707 39.56 (20.98)* 
70.36 
(32.45)** 
301.59 
(80.26)*** 
30.43 (31.18) 
2005 28,236 
60.17 
(22.29)*** 
34.78 (21.35)* 74.20 (31.50)** 6.34 (16.89) 
2006 28,174 
83.32 
(26.91)*** 
47.21 (26.41)* 11.47 (78.72) 17.11 (25.19) 
2007 28,760 
38.87 
(24.70)(!*) 
47.15 (25.17)* -18.23 (44.78) -19.41 (13.13) 
2008 28,425 
69.11 
(33.21)** 
52.33 
(23.65)** 
-11.36 (26.80) -0.28 (16.32) 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard deviation in brackets. 
Note 2: Identifying assumption is satisfied in bolded rows. 
 
The DiD estimator of local revenues per capita yield a general conclusion: the 
entrance of HSR in Spanish municipalities has induced an increase in own 
revenues collected by local governments. Moreover, this positive spillover goes 
from municipalities with HSR stations up to a radius of 5 km. In the two oldest 
routes, this effect increases to a 10 km radius. However, only data from 2005 
satisfy the identifying assumption. 
By using the average revenues per capita in Table 3 and the coefficients estimated 
in Table 4, we find that HSR entrance would induce an increase in local revenues 
per capita close to 10%. 
This effect may have been induced by the greatest economic development at the 
local level. Hernández (2012) estimates the impact of the HSR network on 
employment, which shows a direct relation between the infrastructure and 
generation of economic spillovers. However, do they really improve the 
                                                                                                                                               
economies of scale (population) in fiscal gap per capita; lower outcomes at crisis time; etc. All estimation results are 
available upon request. 
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performance of local finances? Table 5 repeats the previous procedure by focusing 
on the fiscal gap per capita. 
Table 5. DiD estimation of the fiscal gap per capita on the entrance of HSR 
Entrance of 
HSR in… 
Observations HSR station 
HSR station + 
buffer 5 kms 
[5-10 
kilometers] 
[10-20 
kilometers] 
2003 25,807 -23.98 (27.71) -53.49 (31.07)* 
-158.87 
(98.10)* 
-65.78 (37.84)* 
2005 25,384 
-52.06 
(32.35)* 
-67.88 
(19.41)*** 
-14.21 (28.34) -27.16 (16.43) 
2006 25,328 
-75.45 
(44.45)* 
-56.37 
(23.98)** 
45.89 (48.47) -19.79 (24.73) 
2007 25,855 
-60.19 
(28.77)** 
-16.96 (32.03) 44.18 (40.36) -3.18 (19.76) 
2008 25,554 -113.33 (80.44) 
-60.68 
(28.64)** 
-20,85 (27.46) 10.68 (19.67) 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard deviation in brackets. 
Note 2: Identifying assumption is satisfied in bolded rows. 
 
Estimations for 2006 and 2008 may be biased because they do not satisfy the 
identifying assumption using test described by Albalate (2008). Nevertheless, the 
statistical significance of the variable and negative sign of DiD suggest that local 
revenues increase after HSR entrance and that local governments take advantage 
of this better performance in order to improve their own local fiscal gap. As in 
Table 4, the most significant coefficients are those for municipalities located within 
a 5 km radius and those where HSR entrance occurred in the early years. 
By comparing these positive effects on the fiscal gap per capita with the average 
data before entrance described in Table 3, the estimated effect on the fiscal gap is 
close to -16%, namely there is a higher surplus (or lower deficit) due to HSR 
entrance. 
The estimations in Table 6 use debt per capita as an endogenous variable. No 
coefficients, except in two cases, show statistical significance, implying no change 
in local debt per capita after HSR entrance in affected municipalities. 
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Table 6. DiD estimation of public debt per capita on the entrance of HSR 
Entrance of 
HSR in… 
Observations HSR station 
HSR station + 
buffer 5 kms 
[5-10 
kilometers] 
[10-20 
kilometers] 
2003 25,807 2.62 (15.55) -0.80 (5.53) 4.95 (3.90) -0.88 (9.23) 
2005 25,384  -7.09 (15.58) 2.37 (6.04) 1.19 (5.31) -2.80 (3.67) 
2006 25,328 26.23 (23.86) 11.44 (7.64) 2.45 (6.72) -4.99 (4.59) 
2007 25,855 14.82 (15.79) 5.09 (6.24) -9.51 (4.29)** -7.94 (3.06)** 
2008 25,554 54.95 (57.54) 12.96 (13.54) 0.35 (5.14) -3.23 (4.07) 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard deviation in brackets. 
Note 2: Identifying assumption is satisfied in bolded rows. 
 
To summarise these results, we must highlight the capacity of HSR infrastructure 
to generate spillovers at the local level. The increase of revenues at the 
municipality level may generate two types of spillovers, as explored by Solé-Ollé 
(2006b): benefit spillovers that arise from the provision of local public goods and 
crowding spillovers that arise from the crowding of facilities by residents in 
neighbouring jurisdictions. Therefore, from the direct effects, other benefits may 
arise from the provision of public infrastructure. All of these are associated with 
the increase in density and the concentration of jobs, facilities and economic 
agents. In this sense, Hernández (2012) supports this idea by capturing a positive 
and significant effect of HSR infrastructure on employment density at the local 
level in Spain. 
Lastly, another important aspect is how regions may compete to attract economic 
activity through a reduction in the tax rate or increases in public facilities 
(Dembour and Wauthy, 2009). Our analysis suggests no competition in property 
taxes, as Delgado and Mayor (2011) find for nominal rates on data on 2004, and no 
increases in public expenditure beyond the optimal one; moreover, there is a 
reduction in the fiscal gap when comparing cities with and without HSR 
infrastructure. 
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6. Conclusions 
HSR infrastructure is often subsidised with public money collected from public debt 
growth or tax pressure increases. These costly infrastructures generate social benefits that 
should set off the huge costs of investment, maintenance and operation. Social benefits are 
mainly time savings and the reduction in operating costs; however, we are interested in 
analysing the impact of the infrastructure on local budgets. 
The question that we answer in this paper is whether the entrance of this new 
infrastructure generates spillovers at the local level. The argument behind our analysis is 
that the generation of new economic activity influences local budgets by increasing public 
revenues. However, the new infrastructure may induce extra expenses because the need to 
provide new services or facilities may affect the local fiscal gap, namely the difference 
between own local expenditure and local revenue (excluding transfers). 
This paper has two main novelties because we consider the use of GIS tools to capture the 
role of distance and to assess whether we can determine the influence area of the 
infrastructure and we explore the impact of infrastructure at the local level. To our 
knowledge, no previous paper has focused on these impacts. 
We consider a local database in Spain for the last decade (2001–2010) to appraise these 
questions individually. Our DiD estimations show that there is an improvement in the 
public revenues and the fiscal gap, which means that there is an increase in economic 
activity and thereby extra revenues. These extra revenues are generated by an increase in 
economic activity and not due to an increase in tax rates. Moreover, this effect is most 
noticeable in those municipalities located within a 5 km radius of an HSR station. 
Further research is required in this field. It would be interesting to examine the 
mechanisms of these spillovers to understand the roles of the input and product markets. 
This would be essential from a policy perspective to determine the optimal location of an 
HSR station. More research is also required to explore the role of the institutional 
framework in the impact of the infrastructure on the spillover effects. 
 
 
21 
 
References 
Albalate, D. 2008. Lowering blood alcohol content levels to save lives: The 
European experience. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 27(1), 20-39. 
Albalate, D., and Bel, G., 2012. High-Speed Rail: Lessons for Policy Makers from 
Experiences Abroad. Public Administration Review, 72 (3), 336-349, May/June 
2012. 
Allers, M., de Haan, J., and Sterks, C., 2001. Partisan influence on the local tax 
burden in the Netherlands. Public Choice 106, 351-363. 
Aschauer, D, A., 1989. Is public expenditure productive? Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 23, 177-200.  
Bastida, F., Benito, B., and Guillamón, M., 2009. An empirical assessment of the 
municipal financial situation in Spain. International Public Management Journal 12 
(4), 484-499. 
Benito, B., Bastida, F., and Muñoz, M., 2010. Factores explicativos de la presión 
fiscal municipal. Spanish Accounting Review 13 (2), 239-283. 
Campos, J., and de Rus, G., 2009. Some stylized facts about high-speed rail: A review 
of HSR experiences around the world. Transport Policy, 16 (1), pp. 19-28. 
Delgado, F. J., Mayor, M. 2011. Tax mimicking among local governments: some 
evidence from Spanish municipalities. Portuguese Economic Journal, 10, 149-164. 
Dembour, C., and Wauthy, X., 2009. Investment in public infrastructure with 
spillovers and tax competition between contiguous regions. Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, 39, 6, 679-687. 
de Rus, G., 2012. Economic evaluation of the high speed rail. Expert Group on 
Environmental Studies, Ministry of Finance, Sweden, 2012. Available at 
http://www.ems.expertgrupp-se/Default.aspx?pageID=3. 
22 
 
Engen, J. S., and Skinner, 1996. Taxation and Economic Growth, National Tax 
Journal, 1996:617–642. 
Esteban Martín, V., 1998. La Alta Velocidad Ferroviaria en la Unión Europea. Su 
Impacto Urbano en Francia y España [High-speed Rail in the European Union: 
Urban Impact in France and Spain]. Geographicalia 36: 19–32. 
Givoni, Moshe. 2006. Development and Impact of the Modern High-Speed Train: A 
Review. Transport Reviews 26(5): 593–611. 
Gonçalvez, L., and Veiga, F., 2007. Polítical business cycles at the municipal level. 
Public choice 131 (1), 45-64. 
Graham, D, J., 2006. Investigating the link between productivity and agglomeration 
for UK industries. Report prepared for UK Department for Transport. 
Gramlich, E, M., 1994. Infrastructure investment: A review essay. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 32, 1176-1196. 
Grembi, V., Nannicini, T., Troiano, U. 2012. Policy Responses to Fiscal Restraints: A 
Difference-in-Discontinuities Design. Harvard University Working Paper. 
Gutiérrez Puebla, J., 2004. El tren de alta velocidad y sus efectos espaciales. 
Investigaciones Regionales, 5, 199-221. 
Haughwout, A. F., 2002. Public infrastructure investments, productivity and 
welfare in fixed geographic areas. Journal of Public Economics, 83(3), March 2002, 
405-428. 
Hernández, A., 2012. Los efectos territoriales de las infraestructuras: La inversión 
en redes de Alta Velocidad Ferroviaria. FEDEA, Colección Estudios Económicos 05-
11. 
Holtz-Eakin, D., 1994. Public-sector capital and the productivity puzzle. Review of 
Economic and Statistics, 76, 12-21. 
23 
 
Jiménez, J.L. and Betancor, O., 2012. When trains go faster than planes: the 
strategic reaction of airlines in Spain, Transport Policy, 23, 34-41. 
Krugman, P., and A., J., Venables, 1995. Globalization and the inequality of nations, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 4, 857-880. 
Lago-Peñas, S., 2004. Local governments' asymmetric reactions to grants: looking 
for the reasons. Papeles de trabajo del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Serie Economía, 
22 
MEH, 2013. Estadísticas territoriales. Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, 
http://www.minhap.gob.es/ 
Munnell, A. H., 1990. How does public infrastructure affect regional economic 
performance? Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 69-112. 
Pettersson-Lidborn, P., 2001. An empirical investigation on the strategic use of 
debt. The Journal of Political Economy 109 (3), 570-583. 
Puga, D. 2002. European regional policy in light of recent location theories. Journal 
of Economic Geography, 2 (4), 373-406. 
SACTRA, 1999. Transport and the economy: Full report. The standing advisory 
committee on trunk road assessment (SACTRA). 
Solé-Ollé, A., 2006. The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: empirical 
evidence from local government in Spain. Public Choice 126 (1), 145-176. 
Solé-Ollé, A., 2006b. Expenditure spillovers and fiscal interactions: Empirical 
evidence from local governments in Spain. Journal of Urban Economics, 59 (1), 32-
53. 
Thompson, L. S., 1994. High Speed Rail in the United States – Why Isn’t There 
More?, Japan Railway and Transport Review, 32-39. 
Van den Berg, Leo, and Peter Pol. 1998. The European High-Speed Train-Network 
and Urban Development. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
24 
 
Vickerman, R. W. (ed.), 1991. Infrastructure and regional development, Pion, 
London. 
Vickerman, R. W., 2002. Transport and economic development in Transport and 
Economic Development, Round Table 119, 139-177, OECD, Paris. 
Voltes-Dorta, A., Jiménez, J.L., and Suárez-Alemán, A., forthcoming. An initial 
investigation into the impact of tourims on local budgets: a comparative analysis of 
Spanish municipalities, Tourism Management. 
Zárate, A., and Vallés, J., 2012. Comportamiento tributario de los gobiernos locales 
españoles, XV Encuentro de economía aplicada, La Coruña 2012. 
25 
 
Annex I 
This annex provides a descriptive analysis of the evolution of HSR passengers in 
Spain for the 20 most important pairs of origins and destinations in terms of 
transported passengers. 
 
Table AI.1. Evolution of HSR passengers in Spain between main corridors 
Corridor 2008 2009 2010 2011 % Change 2011-2008 
Madrid - Barcelona 2,337,913 2,651,598 2,574,92 2,515,681 7.60% 
Madrid - Sevilla 2,577,959 2,386,736 2,216,572 2,140,942 -16.95% 
Madrid - Valencia 817,812 755,091 728,000 1,815,234 121.96% 
Madrid - Málaga 1,490,013 1,499,879 1,434,161 1,440,953 -3.29% 
Madrid- Zaragoza 1,610,501 1,361,161 1,256,190 1,174,158 -27.09% 
Barcelona - Valencia 835,447 879,607 883,989 839,310 0.46% 
Madrid - Córdoba 984,430 872,034 852,652 801,684 -18.56% 
Madrid - Alacant 821,178 763,176 706,000 707,675 -13.82% 
Barcelona - Zaragoza 602,914 526,428 525,136 494,892 -17.92% 
Madrid - Valladolid 806,767 550,973 458,234  436,604  -45.88% 
Madrid - Pamplona 300,000 336,481 343,814 352,558 17.52% 
Madrid - Tarragona 347,000 321,23 313,473 294,927 -15.01% 
Madrid - Murcia 286,958 274,838 258,936 251,040 -12.52% 
Madrid - Lleida 287,883 269,908    
Barcelona - Alacant 251,632 249,651 241,618 243,806 -3.11% 
Madrid - León 122,270 223,000 221,054 236,231 93.20% 
Barcelona-Castellón 223,311 202,047 190,198 204,022 -8.64% 
Madrid-Cuenca  53,610  144,000  
Madrid-Santander 148,977 151,874 145,695 142,204 -4.55% 
Madrid - Donostia e Irún 125,000 137,000 151,352 138,205 10.56% 
Source: Statistics of the Ministry of Transport. Available on the website.  
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By comparing the aggregate, we observe that there is a decrease in traffic between 
2008 and 2011. The percentage decrease is 4.03%. In fact, there are only six routes 
whose traffic increased during this period. This is due mainly to the crisis (e.g. for 
the Madrid–Barcelona route, the decrease in traffic is around 22% for the same 
period). 
Regarding the construction costs of any particular HSR route, we have a lack of 
data because they are not public and, sometimes, the information is even 
contradictory. Nevertheless, we have some examples of the important construction 
costs associated with this infrastructure (Table AI.2). 
 
Table AI.2. Construction costs of HSR lines 
Corridor Construction costs per km. 
Madrid – Segovia - Valladolid 21.72 M€/Km (2006) 
Córdoba - Málaga 19.24 M€/Km 
Madrid – Zaragoza – Barcelona – Frontera Francesa 15.88 M€/Km 
Madrid - Levante 15.07M€/Km 
Madrid- Seville 4.88M€/Km (2001) 
* Construction costs per km are expressed in nominal terms of (2010) 
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Annex II 
We also enquire whether results on local revenues are caused by an increase in 
local taxes rates (using the yearly property tax, the most important at the local 
level in Spain)14 or by a better economic performance at the local level (see 
Hernández, 2012). 
The results obtained in this table must be biased if the local government changed 
this tax rate after HSR entrance. For this reason, we repeat the estimations in 
equation [1] by using the yearly property tax as an endogenous variable. Table 7 
analyses the effect of the entrance of HSR in this regard. 
 
Table 7. DiD estimation of the yearly property tax on the entrance of HSR 
Entrance of 
HSR in… 
Observations HSR station 
HSR station 
+ buffer 5 
kms 
[5-10 
kilometers] 
[10-20 
kilometers] 
2003 26,573 0.01 (0.59) -0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.01)** 
2005 26,095 -0.01 (0.05) -0.03 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.01)*** 
2006 26,035 -0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.01) 
2007 26,623 0.01 (0.04) -0.03 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.01)*** 
2008 26,285  -0.01 (0.04) -0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.01)** 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard deviation in brackets. 
Note 2: Identifying assumption is satisfied in bolded rows. 
 
Although ‘identifying assumption’ is satisfied in years 2006 and 2007, all these 
estimations conclude that no changes in property tax have occurred since the 
entrance of HSR in the local governments affected by this development. Only in 
remote municipalities did we find a decrease in the tax rate of around 0.04 
percentage points. These results are similar to those obtained in the descriptive 
analysis in Table 3 and, in fact, they induce lower local taxation in treatment cities 
than in the control group. 
                                                 
14 Delgado and Mayor (2011) state that the property tax, motor vehicle tax and building activities tax jointly represent 
80% of tax revenue at the local level in Spain. In fact, property tax represents 49% of local tax revenues. 
